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 QUESTIONING BROADCAST REGULATION
 Jonathan Weinberg*
 SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES: CONTROLLING THE
 CONTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST. By Matthew L. Spitzer. New
 Haven: Yale University Press. 1986. Pp. xii, 163. $15.
 Matthew Spitzer has written an ambitious and unusual book, in-
 tended to answer the question whether it is right for our society to
 "regulat[e] broadcasting more intrusively than print" (p. xi). The
 book is unusual not because of the question it addresses, which has
 become commonplace in the communications law field,1 but because
 of the roads Spitzer travels in answering it. In part 1 of the book,
 Economic Rationalesfor Treating the Media Differently, Spitzer draws
 upon the work of such law and economics movement luminaries as
 Ronald Coase2 and Bruce Owen3 to conclude that ultimately there is
 no justification for government regulation of broadcast content. The
 right to broadcast, Spitzer argues, could efficiently be allocated by a
 market rather than by an administrative mechanism, and nothing in
 the resulting industry structure would demand the sort of content reg-
 ulation in place today. In part 2 of the book, Rationales about Effects
 on Viewers, Spitzer examines a variety of studies contained in the psy-
 chological literature relating to the effects on viewers of various cate-
 gories of video programming. There, too, he finds no justification for
 existing broadcast regulation.
 Spitzer's decision to draw on economic and psychological scholar-
 ship in evaluating broadcast regulation is tantalizing. Spitzer, how-
 ever, does not in fact use those disciplines to evaluate broadcasting
 regulation in any broad sense. With rare exceptions, he does not ask
 whether particular approaches to regulating broadcasting are good
 policy or bad. Rather, he asks only whether those approaches for
 broadcasting are different from those in place for print, and, if so,
 whether the differences can be justified with reference to differences
 between the print and broadcasting media themselves. Thus, for ex-
 ample, because we regulate print through a market mechanism,
 * Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School. A.B. 1980, Harvard College;
 J.D. 1983, Columbia Law School. - Ed. The author thanks Jessica Litman for innumerable
 rereadings and invaluable advice.
 1. See, e.g., D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING 46-74 (1979).
 2. See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
 3. See B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1975); see also B. OWEN, J.
 BEEBE & W. MANNING, JR., TELEVISION ECONOMICS (1974).
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 Spitzer addresses himself to whether any differences between broad-
 cast and print justify our failure to regulate broadcast through a simi-
 lar mechanism. In marshalling his arguments that we could regulate
 broadcasting through a market mechanism, just as we do print, he
 declines to ask other questions: Would this be the best regulatory sys-
 tem we could put in place? Is there anything good about existing
 broadcast regulation, and why is it there? What goals should we be
 trying to pursue?
 Spitzer also declines to ask other questions. He does not ask, for
 example, whether content regulation can be justified under our current
 system for allocating the right to broadcast. If we do allocate the right
 to broadcast by means of an administrative agency, does that fact jus-
 tify or require content regulation, or are the two issues wholly sepa-
 rate? Spitzer considers the matter irrelevant to his analysis.4
 These gaps seem to stem from Spitzer's determination to construct
 a line of argument that, if all its links hold, will get him to his desired
 result; he seems more intent on doing that than on exploring the is-
 sues he meets along the way. He ducks a number of interesting ques-
 tions through his approach to burden of proof, which he places on the
 opponents of his position.5 For example, after Spitzer presents a spec-
 ulative plan for allocating broadcast rights through the market, he in-
 dicates that he is entitled to assume that "the details ... can be worked
 out . . . until someone produces convincing data or theories" to the
 contrary (p. 26). Spitzer rejects localism - the notion that we should
 encourage broadcast outlets oriented towards local areas - as a legiti-
 mate concern for broadcast regulators, on the ground that its propo-
 nents have not presented empirical data demonstrating, for example,
 that broadcast coverage of local political news has positive effects on
 voting (p. 41). He states that he can discount the argument that a ban
 on violence, pornography, or profanity in broadcast would benefit so-
 ciety more than a similar ban in print, because nobody has provided
 "specific data" showing that it would (p. 129).
 I found Spitzer's approach disappointing, because the research he
 cites relates directly to a question I would have preferred to see him
 address. Our regulation of the mass media is rooted in a basic set of
 beliefs about the role of communication and media in our society. We
 believe in a marketplace of ideas in which all members of society have
 the opportunity to speak and convince others of the truthfulness of
 their views; we believe that in that marketplace we engage in discourse
 4. P. 26. Spitzer does at one point suggest that administrative allocation of the right to
 broadcast imports political distortion into the licensing process, and thus threatens a pernicious
 form of content control, but he does not elaborate. Pp. 63-64.
 5. Late in the book, Spitzer does explicitly address the question of burden of proof, and
 recognizes that its placement may determine the answers to the questions he raises in those
 discussions. Pp. 93-94, 113-14. He does not seem to recognize, however, the relevance of the
 same point elsewhere in his book.
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 that is essentially rational. Yet the analysis Spitzer undertakes
 throughout the book helps to demonstrate, if only incidentally, that
 most of these beliefs are part of a myth structure that corresponds only
 incompletely to reality. Spitzer declines to ask what implications this
 has for our regulation of mass communication. Indeed, under his
 analysis, the only relevant question is whether the myth structure fails
 in the same way for print and broadcast media.
 In this review I will focus in large part on the first section of
 Spitzer's book, which contains his economic analysis and was previ-
 ously published as Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast. 6 I
 will do so not because I think the psychological issues Spitzer ad-
 dresses in the latter portion of his book are unimportant, but because
 Spitzer himself has rather less to say about them. For the most part,
 Spitzer's second section is devoted not to analytical material but to his
 summary of a number of psychological studies; he sums up their cu-
 mulative impact with the conclusion "not proved." While that con-
 clusion is open to some criticism, I think that the first part contains
 the more interesting analysis and is more usefully treated at length
 here.
 I
 As Spitzer points out, there is no automatic reason why the right
 to broadcast must be parceled out by an administrative agency using
 the licensing model. Many rights in our society, after all, are not allo-
 cated that way. Instead, we use a property rights model. Under that
 set of rules, the rights to use and control a thing are bundled up into
 the concept of "ownership"; the "owner" has fairly absolute control in
 the first instance over the rights to use a thing, but can distribute them
 to others through a system based on private agreements. Those rules
 by now have become fairly complicated, as a glance at the Uniform
 Commercial Code or any state's probate law demonstrates.
 We use a property rights model to regulate the right to speak via
 the printed word. I do not have the absolute right to write my
 thoughts on a piece of paper, photocopy the paper, and distribute it to
 others; I must first own the paper and photocopier, or have permission
 from their owner(s) to use them. If I go around writing on paper that
 belongs to others, or otherwise using communications resources that
 are owned by others, I can be arrested or sued. These are not trivial
 points. Rather, the system created by property rights regulation is one
 under which freedom of the press may be available only to those who
 own one.7 On the other hand, this market-based approach is our sole
 6. Spitzer, Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1349 (1985).
 7. I heard this maxim long ago, with no attribution; Sanford Levinson, in a recent book
 review, attributes a similarly worded thought to A.J. Liebling. See Levinson, Regulating Cam-
 paign Activity: The New Road to Contradiction?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 939, 946 (1985).
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 important mode of regulation of the right to communicate via print;
 we have, for example, established no rules for parceling out that right
 by way of an administrative mechanism.
 We could use an administrative mechanism to distribute the right
 to speak via the printed word. This might involve the establishment of
 a Federal Paper Commission, with the duty of allocating among the
 citizenry the right to communicate in print. As Spitzer poses the no-
 tion, paper is to the written word what broadcast spectrum is to the
 electronic word: The Federal Paper Commission might use the mode
 of distributing equal amounts of paper to all American citizens, or
 perhaps of evaluating the messages that Americans wished to write
 and distributing the most paper to the applicants with the most wor-
 thy messages.
 Similarly, we could change the rules we now use for regulating
 broadcast communication. We now distribute the right to broadcast,
 that is, to use broadcast spectrum, through an administrative mecha-
 nism. The Federal Communications Commission allocates the right
 to broadcast by distributing revocable licenses to do so. It decides
 who should get the licenses, and whether they should keep them, by
 making case-by-case public interest determinations.8 We could, at
 least in theory, allocate broadcast spectrum through a property rights
 mechanism instead. We could, as Spitzer explains, "establish[] a sys-
 tem of private property in spectrum, creating in effect 'deeds' to cer-
 tain frequencies during certain periods of time and at certain field
 strengths. Such deeds would ... confer[ ] the right to exclude others
 and would ... rel[y] on tort, contract, and criminal laws for enforce-
 ment" (p. 3). Spitzer devotes chapter 1 of his book to proving that
 such a system would serve the goal of economic efficiency at least as
 well as the one we now have in place.9
 The aspect of Spitzer's analysis deserving most immediate com-
 ment is his choice of the criteria a regulatory system should satisfy.
 Spitzer begins with the notion that various arguments for the current
 regulatory system "depend, in one way or another, upon the norm of
 economic efficiency - the value of producing and distributing the mix
 of goods and services that consumers desire" (p. 9). He attributes to
 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,10 the foundational Supreme Court
 decision regarding government regulation of broadcast content, the
 8. Our current system, of course, has property rights aspects; licenses once awarded can be
 bought and sold. Not all countries utilizing an administrative mechanism incorporate this fea-
 ture. In Japan, for example, broadcast licenses are essentially inalienable. Our system is none-
 theless quite different from a true property rights system; see text following note 15 infra.
 9. Spitzer does not address the question of how we might put such a system in place in the
 first instance. As for that question, see, for example, De Vany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott,
 A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-
 Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969).
 10. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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 notion that "economic efficiency requires that the government own all
 the spectrum rights" (p. 7). This is a surprising formulation. Red
 Lion, after all, never mentions efficiency as such; it was decided before
 reference by legal scholars to economic efficiency became fashionable.
 The opinion in Red Lion seems to me to rest most firmly on the notion
 that if we allocated and regulated the right to broadcast in a manner
 that gave broadcasters rights analogous to those of frequency "own-
 ers," then the nature of the technology involved would limit access to
 the means of broadcast communication to a few persons or corpora-
 tions; and that noneconomic, first amendment considerations make
 such a choice unacceptable. Spitzer clearly understands this argu-
 ment. He recasts Red Lion as primarily concerned with efficiency,
 however, because he takes it for granted that efficiency should be our
 first goal in structuring a system of media regulation. 1 Spitzer sees no
 need to justify his use of the efficiency criterion, and seems insensitive
 to arguments that might be made against it. He rejects the notion that
 broadcast scarcity might impede efficient distribution through a mar-
 ket system, pointing out that we commonly "distribute much that is
 . . . scarce - diamonds, gold, silver, rare paintings, and so forth"
 efficiently through the market (p. 12). This formulation calls forth its
 own attack. The key to the economic efficiency norm is that goods are
 distributed to those willing to pay the most for them. Spitzer gives
 little attention to the question of whether that norm should govern
 distribution of rights to communicate, as it does distribution of
 diamonds and gold. We do not, for example, distribute the right to
 vote according to an efficiency-oriented mechanism. If we did, poll
 taxes would be required, rather than constitutionally impermissible.12
 Indeed, the most efficient system might well auction the right to vote
 to those willing to pay the most. The current system, by contrast, is
 highly inefficient: The vote is given to many for whom it is valueless,
 while those who would be willing to pay a great deal for the right to
 cast multiple votes are denied the opportunity to do so. Spitzer ig-
 nores the possibility that we might want to structure the right to com-
 municate more like the voting right to which it is related, and less like
 the right to own diamonds and fine art.
 Spitzer's thinking in this regard sometimes seems to reflect the no-
 tion that we should prefer regulation through a property rights model
 because it is not really government regulation at all. This has intuitive
 appeal; we are all used to the traditional law school curriculum's clas-
 11. For another analysis of broadcast regulation that places heavy weight on economic effi-
 ciency, see S. BESEN, T. KRATTENMAKER, A. METZGER & J. WOODBURY, MISREGULATING
 TELEVISION: NETWORK DOMINANCE AND THE FCC (1984) [hereinafter S. BESEN]. Besen,
 Krattenmaker, Metzger, and Woodbury attempt at the outset to consider the goals of broadcast
 regulation, and list goals other than efficiency that they feel such regulation should achieve. See
 id. at 21-30.
 12. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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 sification of legal doctrine into public administrative law, the domain
 of government regulation, and private contracts and property law, the
 domain of purely private ordering. Yet it is misleading to think that
 the modes of social ordering that have come down to us from the Brit-
 ish common law are so natural that they are not really regulation.
 Allocation through an administrative mechanism and allocation
 through a property based market mechanism are simply different
 forms of social ordering.13 Each requires a governmental hand to
 make it go. Regulation through a property rights model would not
 work if the government had not promulgated substantive rules allocat-
 ing rights among owners, and had not established a mechanism to ad-
 judicate those rights. Spitzer thus does not pose a choice between
 regulation and nonregulation; the only choice he presents is in the
 modes of regulation we put in place.14
 Spitzer's own answer to all this presumably would be that we have
 already made a choice to structure the right to communicate in print
 by means of a market mechanism and that the goal of his book is
 simply to determine whether differences between print and broadcast
 themselves justify a different approach to the right to communicate
 electronically. The answer, though, seems both unsatisfying and insuf-
 ficient. It avoids the deeper questions that we might ask as to how to
 structure our mass media regulation. And to the extent that Spitzer
 sets aside, as outside the scope of the book, any profound inquiry into
 what our goals should be in regulating the mass media, whether
 through administrative or market mechanisms, he disserves even the
 narrow goal of comparing print and broadcast. He misses the chance
 for a more nuanced discussion of whether the same regulatory forms
 in print and broadcast would indeed serve those goals equally well.
 II
 Spitzer's analysis of how a market-based system for broadcast allo-
 13. This point is especially patent where, as here, it requires a certain degree of imagination
 for the law giver to find and define "property" around which the rights derived from the property
 rights model can be structured.
 14. We could, of course, abstain from regulating broadcasting at all. The closest we have
 ever come to that position was in 1926-1927, after a court held that while the Secretary of Com-
 merce was obligated to grant a license to each radio license applicant, and had the power to
 assign each to a frequency, he had no power to enforce that assignment if the licensee chose to
 ignore it. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926); see also 35 Op.
 Atty. Gen. 126 (1926) (regulatory powers of the Secretary of Commerce limited to designating
 normal wave lengths and fixing the times during which stations may operate). This ruling led to
 rampant interference, chaos in the radio industry, and the Radio Act of 1927. See Natl. Broad-
 casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943); see generally I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF
 FREEDOM 112-16 (1983). In contrast, Italy's television industry survived quite nicely - and by
 some measures flourished - after a court decision struck down regulation of TV broadcasting.
 See Sassoon, Italy: The Advent of Private Broadcasting, in THE POLITICS OF BROADCASTING (R.
 Kuhn ed. 1985). That country is only today moving towards reregulation. See Wilson, Italian
 TV's Bare Market, Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1988, at G3, col. 1.
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 cation might work nonetheless merits careful study. Its relevance for
 Spitzer lies in the following syllogism: Many arguments supporting
 government regulation of broadcast content flow from the asserted
 scarcity of broadcast spectrum, or otherwise from the economic struc-
 ture of the broadcast industry. If, however, the scarcity of broadcast
 spectrum (to the extent that it exists) and the current industry struc-
 ture are in fact the results of our decision to leave the right to broad-
 cast in the hands of an administrative agency, then we can sweep away
 much of current thinking regarding the need for regulation of content.
 In talking about a system in which the market allocates the right to
 broadcast, Spitzer has in mind not merely a system in which broadcast
 licenses can be bought and sold with minimal governmental oversight.
 Indeed, as Spitzer points out, we have such a system in place now.
 The Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) dismantling in re-
 cent years of its "anti-trafficking" rules, which restricted resale of
 broadcast licenses, has largely ended FCC oversight of the process by
 which those licenses are bought and sold.15 Nor is Spitzer merely ar-
 guing for a system in which the FCC allocates licenses in the first in-
 stance on a nondiscretionary basis. Rather, he argues that the market
 could determine all issues involved in broadcast allocation: the use
 (e.g., radio broadcast or microwave data transmission) each broad-
 caster could engage in, the bandwidth and power it could use, the
 times of day it could broadcast, and so on.
 Spitzer recognizes the complexities involved in such an enterprise.
 He notes that the job of getting each chunk of bandwidth to an appro-
 priate user in a manner that minimizes interference and thus maxi-
 mizes value is made harder where there are many parties involved.
 The costs of simultaneous negotiation among all of the various parties
 may be high, and some parties may be tempted to hold out for too-
 high shares of the wealth created or to seek a free ride on the payments
 of others. 16 We do not leave the analogous (although more simple) job
 of allocating land among heavy industrial, light industrial, commer-
 cial, and residential uses to the market; rather, the institution of zon-
 ing recognizes that that task is better handled by an administrative
 15. FCC "anti-trafficking rules" until recently barred station transfers, absent extenuating
 circumstances, if the licensee had held the station for less than three years. The Commission in
 1982, however, decided that "the public interest could best be served through elimination of the
 three year rule and its underlying 'trafficking' policy." Amendment of Section 73.3597, 99
 F.C.C.2d 971, 972 (1985). Under current FCC rules, Commission scrutiny of any sort of broad-
 cast license transfer is triggered only if the station has been operated by the current licensee for
 less than a year and the current license was awarded after a comparative hearing or by means of
 a minority ownership preference. See 47 C.F.R. ? 73.3597 (1987).
 16. Spitzer dismisses "the question of whether disputes between many parties might produce
 litigation costs that exceed the cost of running an administrative agency" (p. 21) by means of a
 device by this point familiar to his readers; he puts the burden on those who believe that a market
 system would impose unacceptable transaction costs to offer "convincing data or theoretical ar-
 guments" to that effect. P. 22.
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 body. Spitzer is somewhat grudging about the need for zoning of the
 broadcast spectrum, noting that spectrum planners could err and that
 one American city (Houston) has managed to survive without land-
 use zoning. He does, however, ultimately concede that governmental
 zoning might be necessary to help allocate broadcast spectrum.
 Nor is this the only governmental mechanism that we might need.
 There are other areas, Spitzer points out, in which "the market may
 need assistance" (p. 24). Where changing demand or technology calls
 for the reallocation of a large number of spectrum rights to different
 uses - for example, where efficiency calls for transmitting Direct
 Broadcast Satellite programming,17 requiring a great deal of
 bandwidth, over frequencies previously occupied by a large number of
 broadcasters each using only narrow bandwidth - the chances of bar-
 gaining breakdown may be extreme. As for this problem, Spitzer sug-
 gests that the government might use eminent domain to force holders
 of broadcast rights to sell to the more efficient purchaser.18 Spitzer, I
 think, neglects the difficulties that systematic use of eminent domain
 would entail.19 In the land-use context, after all, eminent domain is
 only rarely used to benefit private construction, and government deci-
 sionmakers use the political process - and political criteria - to de-
 cide when it should be exercised. Spitzer would presumably find that
 mechanism unacceptable in the context of allocating broadcast spec-
 trum. An administrative mechanism would have to be established to
 implement eminent domain; eminent domain by its nature requires a
 government body to exercise it, and at least traditionally the govern-
 ment sets initial valuations of the condemned property.20
 17. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
 18. Spitzer also suggests another function for eminent domain; it could be used to assemble
 broadcast spectrum for functions such as the citizens' band. Indeed, although Spitzer doesn't
 discuss the point, the same mechanism would be equally applicable to the task of assembling
 spectrum for any governmental use; governmental uses today take up about half of the available
 broadcast spectrum. See generally Metzger & Burrus, Radio Frequency Allocation in the Public
 Interest: Federal Government and Civilian Use, 4 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1966). Under Spitzer's plan,
 the government presumably would have to assemble spectrum for these uses either by eminent
 domain or by ordinary purchase. This, however, poses no problems for Spitzer's theory: The
 efficiency norm requires that the government pay for the resources it uses just like any other user.
 See Coase, The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, 5 J.L. & ECON. 17 (1962).
 19. He states that "[s]uch a taking of spectrum rights would promote efficient spectrum utili-
 zation in the presence of a market failure and would almost certainly be a 'public use' as required
 by the fifth amendment." P. 24. The constitutionality of this solution, however, seems to me less
 assured than Spitzer supposes. It is supported by eminent domain cases dealing with slum clear-
 ance, in particular the leading case of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954). The various
 courts, however, have found invocation of eminent domain for the use of private parties a diffi-
 cult and contentious issue. See R. NEELY, HOW COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 132-36 (1981).
 Compare Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 632-33, 304
 N.W.2d 455, 458-59 (1981), with Poletown, 410 Mich. at 636-45, 304 N.W.2d at 461-64 (Fitzger-
 ald, J., dissenting), and Poletown, 410 Mich. at 662-81, 304 N.W.2d at 472-80 (Ryan, J.,
 dissenting).
 20. See 6 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN ? 25.5 (P. Rohan
 recomp. rev. 3d ed. 1969).
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 In an attempt to avoid a discretionary government role, Spitzer
 suggests that eminent domain might be made available to anyone of-
 fering ten to twenty percent above the fair market value of the prop-
 erty sought to be condemned. The opportunities for legal
 manipulation of such a system, in which all rides on appraisal and
 valuation, though, seem tremendous. Further, the notion that any
 broadcast spectrum rights would be subject to automatic forced sale to
 any buyer willing to pay a premium over what its lawyer convinced a
 court was fair market value, is both frightening and far from the mar-
 ket ideal. Spitzer's answer that ex-broadcasters dispossessed of their
 frequency rights would be free to purchase the right to broadcast on
 other frequencies is, I think, not an adequate solution. Banishing a
 speaker from the broadcast dial until it can, perhaps, hire the lawyers
 and sink its premium into ousting some other speaker at some other
 location imposes more than mere inconvenience on the bought-out
 party, and invites abuse in an area of sensitive first amendment
 concerns.
 I will not spend a great deal of time on this question, since it is
 always easy to pick on isolated points in an author's presentation.
 Spitzer himself appears to recognize that his discussion does not solve
 all problems; he feels, however, that he has done enough so that the
 burden is shifted onto others to produce "convincing data or theories"
 showing the unworkability of his approach (p. 26). The problem,
 though, emphasizes the tenuous nature of Spitzer's carefully posed line
 of argument. If Spitzer's eminent domain point falls, then his conten-
 tion that we can use a market mechanism to allocate the right to
 broadcast may fall with it; and if that falls, then Spitzer's entire argu-
 ment regarding the lack of economic justification for broadcast con-
 tent regulation unravels.
 III
 Once we imagine government mechanisms for spectrum allocation
 such as eminent domain and zoning, it is not clear how much of a role
 is left for the market to play. It may be that a system characterized by
 these institutions would not be radically different from the one we
 have now, although license renewals would be unnecessary, licenses
 would be even more freely alienable than they are now, and the gov-
 ernment would pay rather less attention than it does now to what
 licensees do with the bandwidth they are allocated. Assuming, how-
 ever, that we could institute a system under which frequency uses were
 substantially less restrained by administrative decisionmaking than
 they are today, what sort of industry structure might result? Spitzer
 speculates that the resulting system would be quite different from the
 one we now have.
 As Spitzer sees it, television freed from its existing legal and insti-
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 tutional constraints probably would be transmitted regionally over Di-
 rect Broadcast Satellites (DBS). In a DBS system, video (or other)
 signals are beamed up from "earth stations" and bounced off satellite
 transponders directly to individual roofs and backyards. A properly
 positioned satellite can cast a signal over the entire continental United
 States.21 Spitzer argues that, on a cost-per-viewer basis, DBS provides
 easily the cheapest mode for video transmission.22
 Faced with competition from more efficient DBS transmission,
 Spitzer reasons, most conventional over-the-air TV broadcasters
 would not survive. In each metropolitan area there might be one or
 two conventional stations offering local news, weather, and sports, and
 perhaps operating as broadcasters only during peak hours. Cable tele-
 vision might survive playing a similar role on an even more local scale.
 Most television signals, further, whether distributed via DBS or con-
 ventional broadcast stations, would be available only by subscription
 (that is, on a pay basis). Many of those stations would offer advertis-
 ing as well.
 What would be the consequences of such an industry structure for
 choosing the proper mode of regulation? For Spitzer, the striking
 thing about such a structure is its similarity to that which today char-
 acterizes the print media. Like print, broadcast uses valuable re-
 sources that are "scarce" in the economist's sense of the term: There
 is a finite amount of resource available, and if you set its price at zero,
 then demand will exceed supply. Like print, broadcast uses resources
 whose supply can be increased if we are willing to sink money and
 effort into the job. Like print, broadcast uses resources that could be
 efficiently distributed through a market mechanism.
 As with print, Spitzer continues, broadcast of entertainment pro-
 gramming (though not news) involves no significant economies of
 scale in the creation and editing phases, but encounters substantial
 economies of scale in the transmission phase, leading to natural mo-
 nopoly unless a common carrier transmission medium is made avail-
 able.23 As with print, a broadcast industry freed from administrative
 21. See L. GROSS, THE NEW TELEVISION TECHNOLOGIES 17 (1983). Spitzer contemplates
 that DBS satellites will serve as regional broadcasters, covering "entire time zone[s]." Pp. 34-40.
 22. Others, as Spitzer concedes, have strongly questioned this conclusion. They argue con-
 vincingly that given the cost of the dishes needed to receive DBS signals, a system relying on
 satellite transmission of video signals to community antennas and cable transmission of the sig-
 nals to individual residences will almost always be cheaper. See Anderson, The Economic, Legal
 and Scientific Implications of Direct Broadcast Satellites, 7 COMM. & L. 3 (1985); Pool, Techno-
 logical Advances and the Future of International Broadcasting, 13 [NHK] STUD. BROADCASTING
 17, 26-31 (1977). Indeed, the system described in this footnote is precisely how premium cable
 television programming such as Home Box Office (HBO) is distributed today.
 23. Spitzer at one point speculates that it might in appropriate circumstances be a good idea
 to require DBS satellites to operate as common carriers, offering transmission to all who are able
 to pay. Pp. 36-37. As it happens, domestic communications satellites have traditionally been
 operated on a common carrier basis; a satellite's transponders (its key radio equipment) were
 typically leased on a first-come, first-served basis, pursuant to "just and reasonable" cost-based
 1278  [Vol. 86:1269
This content downloaded from 141.217.98.21 on Thu, 01 Nov 2018 22:07:55 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Questioning Broadcast Regulation
 allocation might develop into a structure in which nationally and re-
 gionally oriented media coexist with smaller, local media.24 Finally, as
 with print, most media in such a broadcast industry would depend
 economically on a mix of advertiser and reader/viewer payments,
 although a few might depend solely on one or the other.
 The reader may have difficulty with a number of these characteri-
 zations. In general, I find that Spitzer strains too hard to find broad-
 cast and print identical. Thus, for example, Spitzer describes the
 transmission phases in print and broadcast to be essentially similar.
 Spitzer points out that in the print media today, the nature of the
 transmission (that is, delivery) phase helps compartmentalize the mar-
 ket into newspaper, periodical, and book components. In the newspa-
 per sector, speedy newspaper delivery within a metropolitan area is
 quite close to a natural monopoly, a factor that has contributed to the
 death of competition among major newspapers in our nation's cities.25
 In the periodical sector, low-cost common carrier transmission
 through the United States Postal Service has allowed the creation of a
 lively marketplace of ideas and information populated by some fairly
 small publishers. And in the book sector, a different transmission
 mechanism has also yielded favorable results.
 Spitzer notes the economies of scale that characterize broadcast
 transmission, and argues that broadcasting is just like print in that it is
 characterized by "a naturally monopolistic bottleneck" in the trans-
 mission phase; he concludes that therefore "market structures for
 print and broadcast, absent regulatory shaping, would probably re-
 semble one another considerably" (p. 40). Though I am not trained in
 economics, the existence of such a bottleneck for broadcast is much
 less clear to me. The cause of the bottleneck in print lies in the fact
 that low-cost, large-scale delivery to a large number of homes in a
 given area is a true natural monopoly; it is inefficient to have more
 than one entity doing the job.26 Even if we accept Spitzer's conclu-
 tariffs. See 47 U.S.C. ?? 201, 202, 203 (1982). Notwithstanding the common carrier legal
 scheme, however, because leases were awarded on a long-term basis and satellites were in short
 supply, transponder service was not in fact available to all who were willing to pay cost-based
 rates. See Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1470 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In
 1982, the FCC authorized domestic satellite owners to offer transponder service on other than a
 common carrier basis. Id. at 1471-73.
 24. Spitzer implicitly concedes to his opponents the fact that the current broadcast industry
 is dominated by local media. While this adequately describes the formal law of broadcast regula-
 tion, it seems a curious description at least of television. The vast majority of television program-
 ming today, after all, is distributed nationally, either through the over-the-air networks or on
 cable. Broadcasting is not coming to resemble print by developing overarching national media,
 as Spitzer states; rather, today's media news is that print is developing national media such as
 USA Today and is thus coming to resemble broadcast.
 25. See generally P. BENJAMINSON, DEATH IN THE AFTERNOON: AMERICA'S NEWSPAPER
 GIANTS STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL (1984).
 26. The point, however, should be approached with caution; in Japan, for example, four
 mass-oriented, largely politically undifferentiated, national newspapers with circulations in the
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 sions about economies of scale in broadcast, however, those economies
 of scale do not a natural monopoly make. Under existing technology,
 each transmitting station or satellite can carry only a limited number
 of signals. The industry therefore demands a fair number of stations
 or satellites engaging in broadcast transmission; yet I am aware of no
 particular structural reason why it should be more efficient for one
 entity to control multiple stations or satellites. The problem, then, is
 not so much natural monopoly as simple entry barriers caused by the
 cost of access to transmission facilities. As our experience with do-
 mestic communications satellites has shown,27 common carrier regula-
 tion may not significantly lower those barriers. Indeed, if Spitzer is
 wrong about the role that would be played by DBS, then the role of
 cable systems, supplying communities with programming that they
 themselves receive by satellite, may well present a natural monopoly
 bottleneck; but that would be a problem quite different from any ex-
 isting in the print media today.28
 One thing this analysis demonstrates, though, is that it is hard
 and pointless - to make comparisons between the two media in a
 vacuum. In comparing existing print media and hypothetical broad-
 cast, it is necessary to know what one is looking for, and thus what
 differences between the two industries are relevant. Indeed, print and
 broadcast are different in at least one obvious respect: one uses paper
 and the other uses broadcast spectrum. Is that difference relevant in
 structuring a regulatory system? The answer to that question depends
 on the criteria one wishes the regulatory system to satisfy.
 IV
 Spitzer's answers to the question of what criteria a regulatory sys-
 tem should satisfy are more reassuring on some occasions than on
 others. His performance is disturbing when he is forced to consider
 the relevance of one key difference he finds between broadcast and
 print: that the broadcast entities one would be likely to see in a prop-
 erty rights system would likely be larger than existing newspaper pub-
 lishers (pp. 40-41). There are a variety of reasons one might consider
 the sheer size of dominant broadcasters to be a problem. For those
 concerned today about the media power of large publishers and broad-
 casters, size is itself a concern. Certainly FCC policy has historically
 been marked by a desire to limit the geographical reach of media enti-
 ties so as to limit their media power.29 For those concerned about ease
 millions are distributed in the same service areas through home delivery. See generally Y. KIM,
 JAPANESE JOURNALISTS AND THEIR WORLD 5-8 (1981).
 27. See note 23 supra.
 28. As for that question, see Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754
 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), affd., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
 29. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. ? 73.3555 (1987).
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 of entry into the industry, similarly, the size of its existing members is
 a key issue.
 Spitzer does not address any of these arguments. He implicitly
 sees regional broadcasters, transmitting signals covering major por-
 tions of the country, as presenting no efficiency barrier nor any threat
 of oligopoly more worrisome than that already existing in the print
 media. He does mention the argument that the regulatory system
 should encourage local (i.e., metropolitan area) broadcasters in the in-
 terests of fostering a sense of community in the cities the broadcasters
 serve and educating their populations about local political issues.30
 Largely without analysis, he rejects those arguments as unproved.
 The burden is on the "proponent of regulation," he states, to demon-
 strate convincingly that local broadcasting would have positive influ-
 ences on voting behavior, or that it would better foster a sense of
 community than regional broadcasting (pp. 40-41). He sees no hard
 evidence that it would.
 Later on, Spitzer more extensively addresses values other than eco-
 nomic efficiency. Relying on a well-known article by Lee Bollinger, he
 identifies those values as access and diversity.31 He defines access as
 "the ability of any individual in a particular market to place his
 message within the reach of the audience," and diversity as "the heter-
 ogeneity of material produced in any given market" (p. 51).
 Spitzer's treatment of these issues bypasses some interesting points.
 Spitzer divorces diversity from the notion that a free battle of differing
 ideas will aid the search for truth, and ties it instead to economic con-
 cerns; diversity, he reasons, serves consumer welfare by making many
 30. "Localism" has been a key FCC regulatory goal for some decades. See, e.g., Policy State-
 ment on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395 (1965); cf S. BESEN, supra note
 11, at 27-29 (discussing and rejecting several possible justifications for a policy favoring local
 broadcasters).
 31. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regu-
 lation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976). Bollinger in this article suggested that the
 first amendment might be well served by imposing regulation designed to ensure "access" to
 either print or broadcast, and leaving the other free from such regulation. Society would thus
 have the benefit of both a medium marked by safeguards against the arbitrary use of private
 media power on the one hand, and a medium free from the potentially choking hand of the
 government regulator on the other. Spitzer rejects Bollinger's argument in part on the ground
 that it
 skews the distribution of values served in favor of those people who strongly prefer receiving
 one medium or the other. For example, those who cannot read ... will be confined to the
 values of fair but homogenized communication. Conversely, those who live in areas un-
 served by broadcast may be confined to interesting but biased publications because none are
 subject to the fairness doctrine. Because millions of people cannot read and many own no
 television set, these effects are very important.
 P. 46 (footnotes omitted). Spitzer notes as well that the current system fails to protect many
 newspapers from government interference, because the government can exercise leverage over
 broadcasters that are linked to the newspapers by ties of corporate affiliation. Pp. 50-51. This is
 certainly true, but it is hardly a telling blow against Bollinger's theory; Bollinger might simply
 respond that we should therefore ban corporate affiliations between newspapers and
 broadcasters.
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 types of programs available and thus making it more likely that view-
 ers will be able to watch the types of programs they value most. The
 diversity Spitzer seeks appears to relate to the types of programming
 produced (such as news, sports, and situation comedies), rather than
 the range of ideas and values being put forward. Emphasizing con-
 sumer welfare, Spitzer implicitly denigrates approaches seeking to ad-
 vance goods such as, say, improvement in the quality of public
 discourse, or informed voting, or participation in public affairs, as
 "castor oil" regulation, imposing what is seen as "good for the people
 regardless of their pleasure" (p. 52).
 Spitzer's inattention to the social policy concerns animating our
 first amendment norms enables him to leave unexamined some of the
 predicates of his own argument. Access and diversity are important
 precisely because they advance first amendment values; indeed, to my
 mind, the only legitimate justification for any system of communica-
 tions regulation is that it promotes first amendment values better than
 do other approaches.32 Spitzer's analysis takes as a given that our reg-
 ulation of the print media adequately achieves those values, and thus is
 an appropriate model for broadcast. Yet thinking about Spitzer's eco-
 nomic analysis helps lead to the conclusion that our first amendment
 beliefs are incompletely realized even in the print medium. That dis-
 parity between the ideal and the actual casts some doubt on his pro-
 posals for broadcast.
 As Spitzer acknowledges, our society prizes the right to individual
 self-expression.33 This might suggest the desirability of working to-
 wards a system in which as many people as possible have the option to
 engage in mass communication on a meaningful level. Our first
 amendment mythology is premised on the notion that almost everyone
 does have that option: We are confident that even the most impover-
 ished proponents of unpopular causes have the right and the ability to
 distribute pamphlets to the masses, and thus ultimately to win accept-
 ance of their ideas.34 We bottom our thinking about the first amend-
 ment, in the print context, on that basis.
 Yet this mythology, at best, seems to describe reality incompletely.
 In the marketplace of ideas, the better-funded voices speak louder than
 others,35 and the ability of the average citizen, no matter how commit-
 32. But cf. CBS v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, J., concur-
 ring) (stressing the dangers we invite "when we lose sight of the First Amendment itself, and
 march forth in blind pursuit of its 'values' ").
 33. Pp. 45-46; see, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1941) (first
 amendment protects "the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if
 life is to be worth living").
 34. Some of our most elegant rhetoric about the importance of the first amendment was
 inspired by such hopeless causes. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes,
 J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
 35. See, e.g., Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obsta-
 cle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982).
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 ted, to speak in any but the softest of voices is limited. Furthermore,
 that problem intuitively seems even more pronounced with regard to
 broadcast than to print, and Spitzer's proposal, at least superficially,
 seems designed to accentuate it. The existence of that gap between
 myth and reality poses an initial question: Is it possible or desirable
 for a regulatory system to level that playing field?
 Another concept stressed in our first amendment jurisprudence is
 that of the "marketplace of ideas." It is at the core of our jurispru-
 dence that mass communication should provide a forum in which im-
 portant ideas can be thrashed out, and through which individuals can
 decide for themselves what is true and right.36 If we were to take this
 idea seriously, then ideally we would want our mass media to be a
 forum where all, or most, important ideas were in fact discussed; we
 would want a diversity of viewpoints to be presented; and we would
 want ideas to prevail in that forum on the basis of reasoned argument,
 not on the basis of some voices simply drowning out others. Our dom-
 inant mythology provides that, by and large, all speakers and ideas
 indeed do have access to the communications marketplace, and that
 truth does win out in the end.37 Further, to some extent, the system
 does work: While their circulation is not high, national magazines do
 provide a wide range of ideas and argument on a wide variety of issues.
 Yet again, the ideals I have set out are in many ways far from our
 current reality. Scholars have documented the extent to which some
 ideas are not seriously discussed in our mass society at all,38 and it is
 hard to deny the role played, in our consideration of various political
 questions, by the level of funds available to each side.39 It is largely in
 response to the notion that the print model could not engender a
 proper marketplace of ideas in the broadcast arena that the FCC cre-
 ated "fairness" regulation in the first place.40 Yet that regulation has
 36. Thus Justice Holmes's famous pronouncement in Abrams v. United States: "[T]he best
 test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
 ket .. ." 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
 v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969). But see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
 Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
 [I]dentification of speech that falls within [first amendment] protection is not aided by the
 metaphorical reference to a "marketplace of ideas." There is no reason for believing that the
 marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any more than there is to believe that
 the invisible hand will always lead to optimum economic decisions in the commercial
 market.
 37. We have thus, for example, rejected as "wholly foreign to the First Amendment," Buck-
 ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976), the notion that there is any need to restrict corporate power
 to speak, though that power has been challenged "as seriously threatening the role of the First
 Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas." First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
 765, 810 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
 38. See C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 201-13 (1977).
 39. See Wright, supra note 35.
 40. For early expressions of Commission views, see Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13
 F.C.C. 1246 (1949); In re United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945); In re The Mayflower
 Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940); In re Young People's Assn. for the Propagation of the
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 obvious and serious defects: Not only does it inject governmental con-
 tent regulation into broadcasting, but forcing people to talk about im-
 portant issues and ideas, on pain of losing their licenses, seems a
 flawed method of achieving worthwhile discussion in the first place.
 These too are questions for the regulatory system: How can we set a
 system in place under which such "free and open encounter"41 be-
 tween opinions can take place?
 We often speak of the first amendment as fostering the goal of
 political self-government. "[A] people who mean to be their own Gov-
 ernors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
 gives."42 This suggests that, in an ideal system, broadcasters would
 supply the community with the information it needs to govern itself.
 Yet that raises a point I have skimmed over in the last few pages:
 While the print media in large extent do cover news and political is-
 sues, television for the most part provides not news and opinion but
 entertainment, the relevance of which to the pressing issues of the day
 may be attenuated at best. Indeed, many broadcasters have tradition-
 ally provided the little news and public affairs programming that they
 have only because the FCC, through the fairness doctrine and atten-
 tion to local programming, required them to do so.43 How should the
 regulatory mechanism address this issue?
 Finally, we might plausibly state that all persons possess a right to
 receive mass communication;44 the Communications Act of 1934
 states as its basic goal the provision "to all the people of the United
 States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide ... wire and radio communica-
 Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938); see also Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio
 Commn., 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); In re Great Lakes
 Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32, 33 (1929), revd. on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C.
 Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
 The FCC held this past August that it would no longer enforce the fairness doctrine; that
 complex of rules, it held, "contravenes the First Amendment and thereby disserves the public
 interest." In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, T 98 (Aug. 6, 1987). It is not yet
 clear as of this writing whether that ruling will stand.
 41. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644 & photo. reprint 1927).
 42. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), quoted in Note, The Right to
 Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 505, 506 (1979).
 The Supreme Court has frequently identified self-government as the central social goal the
 first amendment serves. See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771, 776-77 (1978); Buck-
 ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Gros-
 jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). See generally New York Times Co. v.
 Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
 43. Regarding the fairness doctrine, see note 40 supra. Until a few years ago, informal Com-
 mission guidelines strongly encouraged broadcasters to program at least five percent local pro-
 gramming and at least five percent news and public affairs programming between 6 a.m. and
 midnight. The FCC abandoned those guidelines for radio in 1981, see Deregulation of Radio, 87
 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), and for television in 1984, see Revision of Programming and Commerciali-
 zation Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial
 Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984).
 44. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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 tion service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."45 But in a
 world characterized by the increasing importance of fast, easy, and
 cheap distribution of and access to information,46 the prospect of cre-
 ating a new class of the information-poor holds open the threat of fur-
 ther stratifying our society. This concern is not addressed by
 efficiency-oriented analyses of broadcast regulation; on the contrary,
 the essence of efficiency is that goods and services go to those ultimate
 consumers willing to pay the most for them. Yet the notion of a regu-
 latory system that would provide an ever greater diversity of speech, at
 ever increasing prices, only to those listeners able to pay, may raise
 new threats to our basic beliefs and our basic values. This provides a
 final problem that no regulatory analysis can fail at least to address:
 Stephen Carter has warned of a "New First Amendment, with . . .
 guaranties of freedom of speech for those who can afford it, and free-
 dom to listen for those who cannot."47 Can we afford a system under
 which the poorer of us cannot afford even to listen?48
 V
 The coin of access and diversity may buy almost all of the goods
 set out above. Indeed, Spitzer would explain, the notion that as many
 people as possible should have the option to engage in mass communi-
 cations is but the goal of access renamed; and, he might continue, the
 marketplace of ideas is just another reflection of the same concept.
 The most reasonable way to encourage the marketplace of ideas, he
 might argue, would be to structure our mass media around the initial
 goal that all speakers with an interest in presenting their views to the
 public through the mass media have the capability of doing so. Such a
 system would require a multiplicity of media outlets, and (I would
 add) would further require that those who control those outlets not
 have too great an incentive to avoid political issues on the ground that
 avoidance would attract greater audiences and better please advertis-
 ers.49 But those factors in turn could be assured by achieving wide
 access to the means of mass communication. If all speakers primarily
 concerned with conveying political messages (as opposed to those pri-
 45. 47 U.S.C. ? 151 (1982) (emphasis added).
 46. For a little-read perspective on this phenomenon, see Bowes, Japan's Approach to an
 Information Society: A Critical Perspective, 2 KEIO COMM. REV. 39 (1981).
 47. Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent (Book Review), 93
 YALE L.J. 581, 607 (1984).
 48. Spitzer questions whether we need to worry about some of these matters. Thus, so far as
 the goal of political self-government is concerned, he asks, "Do watching television and listening
 to the radio inform voters? If so, is it in a good way? Do voters alter their voting behavior based
 on this information? Do they vote more often? Are the changes, if any, good ones?" P. 41. He
 does not answer the questions he poses, explaining that they are "expressly beyond the scope of
 this book." Id.
 49. See T. GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 252-60 (1983).
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 marily concerned with commercial success) in fact have access to the
 means of mass communications, the "marketplace of ideas" is assured.
 As for broadcast's role in disseminating political information and
 ideas, it may be that broadcast is held back by the inherent limitations
 of the medium: A newspaper can choose to cover public affairs in
 depth, simply by adding additional pages. A single television signal,
 on the other hand, can devote additional time to one matter only by
 taking it away from another. The upshot is that to the extent that any
 given broadcast signal wishes to capture a large segment of the mar-
 ket, it must ration its programming and offer no more public affairs
 programming than the average viewer is interested in watching.
 Yet here too, access - or at least multiplicity of media outlets
 would help provide an answer. Our experience with both radio and
 cable television suggests that the greater the number of media outlets
 in a market, the greater the degree to which many of those speakers
 can and will direct their programming to special or fringe interests,
 and news and public affairs are a special interest that we can rely on at
 least a few speakers in such markets to cover fairly extensively. Thus
 if we achieve ease of access into the media marketplace, the problem of
 public affairs programming takes care of itself.50
 And the problem of pricing some listeners out of the market? Here
 Spitzer's analysis would not provide a solution.51 Yet if a property
 rights approach would achieve all of the other goals just discussed,
 that it falls short of perfection perhaps should not be considered fatal.
 It is worth moving on, therefore, to the question whether regulation of
 broadcasting through a property rights system would in fact achieve
 those goals.
 Unfortunately for Spitzer's argument, his conclusion that a prop-
 erty rights system would best foster access and diversity does not fol-
 low smoothly from his earlier premises. Spitzer finds that the best
 source of both diversity of voices and access to the market for fringe
 speakers is the existence of a large number of media outlets, and con-
 cludes: "the crucial issue with respect to access and diversity is
 whether there are enough broadcasters in the market" (p. 62). Spitzer
 does not go on, however, to argue for a property rights based system
 on the ground that such a system would maximize the number of
 broadcast speakers. He fails to do so presumably because his analysis
 50. The argument does not provide an answer to the objection that public affairs program-
 ming, competently done, may cost more to produce than its producers can receive in terms of the
 advertising or pay-TV value of the audiences they attract. For Spitzer, however, that fact would
 suggest that the programming (since it is not valued by the consumer) is not worth producing in
 the first place.
 51. Some economists might suggest that a problem of this nature is best solved by providing
 the poor with information subsidies modeled after food stamps (or tuition tax credits). Much
 public policy today, however, is based on the realization that while such solutions are theoreti-
 cally pure, that purity as a general matter does not justify the unwieldiness, layers of bureau-
 cracy, and real-world problems they entail.
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 of market structure under a property rights system fails to convince
 him that that would be the case. Spitzer, after all, identifies economies
 of scale bottlenecks as the system's most prominent feature, and char-
 acterizes that system - in the absence of some sort of indistinct com-
 mon carrier regulation - as dominated by national media giants.
 Rather, Spitzer argues, if we take as a given that there are many
 broadcasters in a market, then because existing FCC rules in fact dis-
 courage diversity, a property rights based system will generate greater
 access and diversity than our existing one. If there are few broadcast-
 ers in a market, Spitzer argues, the existing system so badly serves
 access and diversity that there is no reason to believe that a property
 rights based system would not do as well. In that situation, a property
 rights based system should be preferred, since administrative alloca-
 tion leads broadcasters to censor themselves to avoid offending power-
 ful elected officials (p. 63). In any case, Spitzer argues, if we indeed
 wish to encourage access and diversity, a better answer is to require
 broadcasters to act as common carriers in the transmission phase, in-
 creasing both access and diversity by offering broadcast time to any
 speaker willing to pay for it.
 Spitzer for the most part fails to support these conclusions. While
 he discusses a number of specific FCC rules that he states discourage
 the broadcast of diverse programming, he doesn't seem to argue that
 the problems he identifies are basic to any system that allocates the
 right to broadcast through an administrative agency.52 To the extent
 that these are merely incidental mistakes marring our current system,
 they hardly support Spitzer's broader theoretical generalizations. Nor
 does Spitzer provide support for the view that under our current sys-
 tem, access is so difficult, and so skewed to certain segments of society,
 that a property rights based system in a concentrated market would do
 no less well. That may be true; yet there is some reason to believe the
 opposite.
 The lesson of our antitrust laws is that, absent government intru-
 sion, the market works particularly badly where ownership is concen-
 trated and entry barriers are high. The newspaper industry presents a
 concrete example of that in the media context. Almost all areas of our
 country are served by newspaper monopolies,53 with competition ex-
 isting for the most part only at the very high ends of some markets
 (the Wall Street Journal and New York Times), and at the bottom end
 of the rest (the National Enquirer and its competitors).54 Nor is the
 52. Nor, I must confess, do I understand all the points that he makes. Spitzer's argument
 relating to multiple station affiliation, in particular, eludes me completely.
 53. Of the top fifty media markets - those areas of the country most able to support compet-
 ing daily newspapers - only eleven in fact do so. Packwood, Let Newspapers be Newspapers,
 Washington Post, Feb. 9, 1988, at A23, col. 1.
 54. The position of USA Today on this scale is open to some discussion.
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 quality of any but a very few of these newspapers anything to write
 home about. Creative antitrust remedies, such as treating newspaper
 printing plants and distributorships as "essential facilities" to which
 all competitors must be given access,55 might have created more com-
 petition within the industry (or, alternatively, might have thrown it
 into chaos). But we did not choose such remedies.
 We avoided the print model in broadcast regulation in part be-
 cause we feared that technical limitation entry barriers in that medium
 would stifle access.56 The relative scarcity of broadcast frequencies
 suggested that the cost of access to those frequencies would be high,
 and that, even more so than in print, the principle of freedom of the
 press guaranteed to all who own one would provide an illusory free-
 dom. The system we instituted instead, however, is also flawed from
 the perspective of access and diversity.57
 What, then, is the solution? There has been no shortage of com-
 mentators pointing out recently that the current system works rather
 badly.58 The FCC has demonstrated its own view of the regulation in
 place just a few years ago by dismantling most of it.59 And indeed, the
 government content regulation, potential for political favoritism, and
 capability to still - rather than encourage - controversy inherent in
 the current system make it worth considering any practical
 alternative.
 I have no definitive answers to offer here. This is perhaps the lux-
 ury of the book reviewer, that one can critique the work of others
 without supplying all of the answers oneself. Yet it seems to me that if
 we hope to bring our first amendment mythology and its reality closer
 together, the road to a workable answer could lie in Spitzer's reference
 to common carrier regulation. That regulation alone may not prove to
 be the tool best suited to our needs; Spitzer does not discuss how a
 common carrier system would work, and there is some reason to be-
 lieve that it might not.60 But Spitzer's economic analysis at least sug-
 55. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
 U.S. 956 (1978).
 56. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376-77, 392 (1969); see also note
 40 supra and accompanying text.
 57. The FCC has undertaken some noteworthy initiatives designed to increase access to
 broadcasting. One such initiative was its focus on low-power television (LPTV) stations. These
 are television stations broadcasting with very low power and covering service areas roughly forty
 miles in diameter. The FCC first authorized LPTV in 1980, largely exempting it from regulation
 and hoping to allocate licenses to groups and individuals, especially minorities, who had not
 traditionally been part of the broadcasting scene. By 1985, there were about 80 stations on the
 air in the continental United States. License allocation, however, has been slow, and LPTV's
 future is unclear. See L. GROSS, THE NEW TELEVISION TECHNOLOGIES 141-45 (1983); see also
 Halpern, Adirondack TV: A Low-Power Gamble, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1988, at B1, col. 2 (dis-
 cussing a particular LPTV station).
 58. See, e.g., L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987).
 59. See, e.g., notes 40 & 43 supra.
 60. See note 23 supra.
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 gests that one way to promote more meaningful access, and thus the
 first amendment values we want to serve, could lie in creative struc-
 tural regulation of the industry, perhaps with common carrier fea-
 tures, based loosely on the antitrust model.61 The advent of new
 technology may give us the opportunity to put a new regulatory
 scheme in place, and such a scheme might allow the elimination of
 many of the features of the regulatory structure we now maintain.
 The fact that we don't now so regulate print should not be a disposi-
 tive bar; this may be our chance to try again and do a better job.
 VI
 I will have rather less to say about the second part of Professor
 Spitzer's book, in part because Spitzer himself has rather less to say in
 the second part of his book than he does in the first. In this part of the
 book, Spitzer examines a number of studies found in the psychological
 literature relating to the psychological effects of television watching
 generally, and of exposure to sexually explicit and violent program-
 ming in particular.' Without engaging in extended theoretical analysis,
 he concludes that the studies for the most part do not justify different
 treatment of print and broadcast. He does conclude, however, that
 some regulation, on the zoning model, may be appropriate to shield
 children from profanity, pornography, and violence on the airwaves.
 The psychological studies Spitzer canvasses in this part of his book
 relate to an attack on our "marketplace of ideas" mythology wholly
 different from any I have discussed so far. This attack, a deeper one,
 challenges the psychological premise of that metaphor. That premise
 is that we respond to communication on a rational level, and thus can
 fairly treat new ideas and information on the level of rational dis-
 course: that is, "that there is on the whole a preponderance among
 mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct,"62 and thus that
 we can properly treat speech as a competition of ideas in the meta-
 phorical marketplace.
 Much of the psychological literature Spitzer cites, however, tends
 to call that mythology into question. Spitzer discusses, for example, a
 study indicating that male college students who had watched a short
 movie of a gunpoint rape later showed greater propensity to give wo-
 men targets electric shocks on a "Buss aggression machine" than did
 students who had watched movies of a talk show interview or movies
 of consensual sex.63 Such a study might suggest that the students, on a
 61. On the other hand, the recent controversy regarding a cross-ownership waiver allowing
 Rupert Murdoch to maintain ownership of both newspapers and television stations in New York
 and Boston demonstrates that the administration of even "neutral" structural rules can rnport
 political distortion into the regulatory mechanism. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1988, at A13, col. 1.
 62. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 17 (R. McCallum ed. 1946) (1859).
 63. Each subject was told that he could use the machine to shock another person described to
 him as a fellow subject. The shocks were usually described as part of an evaluation of the other's
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 nonrational level, "learned" aggression against women from the films,
 almost as a conditioned response.64 This raises questions that are es-
 pecially troubling in light of the pernicious nature of the messages con-
 veyed here: To what degree do people "learn" on a wholly
 nonrational level from the messages they receive? How far is the gap
 between that reality on the one hand, and the mythology that I have
 described on the other? Do we base our policy conclusions on views of
 the world that are not in fact accurate, and does it make sense to do
 so?
 These are much the same sort of questions as those that I posed
 regarding the first part of Spitzer's book. Our regulation of the mass
 media is built upon a Lockean image of people as free, equal, rational
 agents, but the economic and psychological insights Spitzer draws
 upon call that image into question. As in the first part of his book,
 however, Spitzer does not address the question whether the models
 through which we think about speech fail us by being too far divorced
 from reality. Rather, he asks whether they fail us in the same way in
 print and in broadcast, and thus whether their failure can justify differ-
 ent regulation.
 I have trouble with several of the steps Spitzer takes in travelling
 that road. First, as Spitzer acknowledges, he labors under a serious
 handicap in answering the question he does pose: whether we react to
 sexually explicit or violent material differently when it is presented in
 print or in video form. Almost none of the studies Spitzer examines
 were designed to answer that question.65 Indeed, the difficulty in de-
 ciding what to use as "comparable" depictions of sex or violence in the
 various media suggest that no study could reliably answer that
 performance on some sort of test. In fact, the machine merely recorded the number and intensity
 of shocks that the subject tried to inflict. Pp. 77-80.
 There is substantial reason to doubt whether studies of the performance of college students on
 Buss aggression machines say very much about the real world. Spitzer acknowledges this point,
 but dismisses it: "The resolution of this question is irrelevant for the purposes of this book, so
 long as it is resolved in the same way for print experiments and broadcast experiments." Pp.
 143-44 n.12. For an exposition of the view that experimental data is useless in this area, see
 Wilson, Violence, Pornography, and Social Science, 22 PUB. INTEREST 45 (1971).
 64. The study as described does not necessarily demonstrate nonrational learning on the stu-
 dents' part. The study was fairly complex, involving both subjects whom the experimenter had
 intentionally made angry before showing the films, and subjects who had not been made angry.
 The study also involved both male and female targets. When the target was male, both the
 consensual sex and the rape movies increased aggression (at least in angered subjects), and by
 roughly the same amount. When the target was female, only the rape film increased aggression.
 Pp. 78-79. Different aspects of the experiment might support a variety of explanations, including
 the one set out in text, or conversely, the notion that subjects in some cases became sexually
 aroused but, through what some psychologists call an arousal mislabeling mechanism, mistook
 their arousal for increased anger. Which hypotheses we come to accept, needless to say, can have
 implications for the policy conclusions we draw.
 65. Spitzer does discuss one elaborate study designed to examine the relationship between
 London boys' propensity to engage in violence and their exposure to reports and stories of vio-
 lence through television, newspapers, movies, and comic books. The study was financed entirely
 by the CBS television network. Pp. 107-10.
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 question.66
 Further, one of Spitzer's conclusions - that "print [depictions of
 sexually explicit matter] may be slightly more potent than video" (p.
 86) - seems to me almost wholly unrelated to the studies from which
 he purports to draw it.67 Spitzer bases this conclusion on his state-
 ment that "sexually explicit print material may increase aggression re-
 gardless of whether or not subjects are angered, and regardless of
 whether or not they are disinhibited from aggression against women"
 (p. 86). When one pulls the jargon out of this sentence and tries to
 figure out the inference Spitzer has in mind, he is apparently saying
 two things. First, he is apparently saying that sexually explicit print
 material is more likely than video to lead to aggressive behavior in
 men who have not first been made angry by the experimenter. Second,
 he is apparently saying that sexually explicit print material is more
 likely than video to lead to aggressive behavior in men who have not
 been "disinhibited," that is, who have not been given repeated chances
 to aggress against women or been shown material whose message is
 that women invite or enjoy rape (p. 85).
 The problem is that the studies Spitzer cites do not support these
 conclusions. He cites only one study that addresses the effect of sexu-
 ally explicit print material on subjects who have not first been made
 angry, and criticizes that study as methodologically flawed.68 He cites
 a study concluding that showing men video depictions of rape does
 increase their aggression against women even when they have not been
 first made angry.69 Indeed, he cites studies indicating that the effect of
 showing at least some sexually explicit video material to angry male
 66. Spitzer states, with reference to sexually explicit material, that "[p]hotographs and sto-
 ries about the same explicitly erotic acts depicted in films or television could be used. A study
 employing such graphic printed material could test for the differential effects of the two media."
 P. 93. Yet this blinks the fact that movies and printed matter are different media, and a depiction
 in one can be transformed to the other only through a creative process. One depiction may be
 more skillfully done than another; a particular story may translate more effectively into one
 medium than to another. Thus if, for example, experimenters seek to make a movie out of a
 given (print) story, the results might well rest entirely on how expert a job of movie-making they
 do.
 67. In examining the link between sexually explicit material and aggressive behavior, Spitzer
 walks through a fairly large number of studies exploring the effects of films, pictures, and short
 stories depicting rape and consensual sex on test subjects' proclivity to aggress and on their
 attitudes towards aggression in general and rape in particular.
 Print, television, film, radio, slides, and live readings were all employed.
 ... Subjects were exposed to a broad range of sexually explicit matter, everything from
 consensual behavior to forced sexual contact which the victim detested to forced sex which
 the victim ultimately enjoyed. Some researchers added an anger variable, insulting or elec-
 tronically [sic] shocking their subjects, while others did not. P. 77.
 The test subjects were almost always men.
 68. Spitzer criticizes the study on the ground that it did not distinguish between material
 depicting consensual sex and that depicting rape; he also states that the study "contradicted the
 findings of earlier works." P. 89.
 69. The same study concluded that exposure to sexually explicit video material did not other-
 wise significantly increase aggression in subjects who had not been made angry. P. 85.
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 subjects was to increase their aggression, but that the effect of showing
 (print media) pictures of attractive nude or seminude women to such
 subjects was to make them less aggressive, perhaps by distracting them
 from their anger. The overall effect of the studies Spitzer cites, I be-
 lieve, is ambiguous and unhelpful on the question he poses. But
 whatever those studies show, they do not show that sexually explicit
 print material is more "potent" than video.
 Similarly, Spitzer's studies do not support the notion that print
 may increase aggression more than video where subjects have not been
 given repeated chances to aggress against women or shown material
 whose message is that women invite or enjoy rape. No print studies
 cited by Spitzer address the link between these factors and aggression
 at all. Some video studies tend to demonstrate a link between these
 factors and aggression. That is, one study indicates that angering male
 test subjects, showing them sexually explicit films, and then giving
 them the opportunity to aggress repeatedly against women, tends to
 lead to increased levels of aggression on the Buss aggression machine.
 Another indicates that showing male test subjects films that depict
 women as ultimately enjoying rape tends to increase those subjects'
 aggression against women. But if Spitzer is reasoning from these stud-
 ies that print is more "potent" because it increases aggression "regard-
 less of whether or not [the subjects] are disinhibited," (p. 86) then his
 conclusion does not follow at all.
 Spitzer ultimately puts forward his own proposal for protecting lis-
 teners from unexpected objectionable material on the broadcast air-
 waves, and allowing parents to keep such material from their children.
 "[B]roadcast stations that transmit objectionable matter could be al-
 lowed to broadcast anything that would be legal if printed, but such
 stations would be concentrated in one section of the spectrum."70
 Adults scanning the broadcast spectrum could avoid that "adult" sec-
 tion if they chose. Further, retailers would not be allowed to sell de-
 vices receiving that portion of the spectrum to minors, and television
 locks would allow parents to disable their sets entirely.
 Spitzer does not discuss, but I wonder, what the implications of
 this further zoning requirement would be for his plan for market allo-
 cation of spectrum. Spitzer argues early in the book that on the "quite
 plausible assumptions" that "telecommunications will continue to en-
 joy rapid technological development and that bureaucratic planners
 would be slow to modify zone assignments[,] . . . the zones would
 always be wrong" (pp. 23-24). As a practical matter, it seems to me
 that a rule relegating objectionable speech to specified spectrum zones
 would likely either impede the market's ability to allocate to other uses
 spectrum so zoned, or impose a substantial ban on such speech in the
 broadcast medium.
 70. P. 126; see also p. 123.
 1292  [Vol. 86:1269
This content downloaded from 141.217.98.21 on Thu, 01 Nov 2018 22:07:55 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Questioning Broadcast Regulation
 VII
 Spitzer's analysis of what he terms the economic justifications for
 content regulation of broadcast suffers from a lack of focus on the
 issue of content regulation, but Spitzer does advance engaging theses
 on what broadcasting might look like if we regulated it by means of a
 property rights model. While those theses are vulnerable to a number
 of attacks, the resulting analysis helps demonstrate the wide range of
 choices we have in shaping communications regulation. It also helps
 point up an economic insight we often lose sight of in thinking about
 communications regulation: Mass communication today is not a game
 that all can play, and indeed even receiving speech may increasingly
 prove too expensive for some.
 Spitzer's analysis of the effects of various forms of programming on
 viewers even more directly points up a psychological insight we gener-
 ally ignore in thinking about communications regulation: We process
 speech on nonrational levels, and to that extent "more speech" may
 not be the counter to pernicious messages that our system assumes
 that it is.
 Spitzer's analysis thus brings fresh perspectives to the old question
 of how to regulate broadcasting. While many may quibble with
 Spitzer's conclusions and reasoning, the argument serves splendidly in
 stimulating the reader to new insights and ideas. Unfortunately,
 Spitzer seems to have no interest in answering some of the most im-
 portant questions his analysis raises. Spitzer ultimately concludes that
 "anyone who cherishes the free market in print must regard the regu-
 lation of broadcasting as unjustified" (p. 131). But the "free market in
 print" has flaws as well as virtues. Before imposing it uncritically on
 broadcast, we might think further about whether the rules governing
 our print media are necessarily the best way to achieve the free speech
 we believe in.
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